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During Voicker's  presidency,  the role of monetary 
aggregates as a guide to policy  came under increasing 
public discussion. In this speech,  Voicker discusses 
the advantages and pitfalls of a strategy of targeting 
monetary aggregates and alternative operating pro- 
cedures. He argues that  monetary targeting imposes a 
beneficial  discipline on Federal Reserve policies.  He 
also notes, however, that instability in  velocity over 
horizons relevant for  policy and the possibility of  credit 
market disturbances make attention to other sources of 
information imperative. 
The Contributions and 
Limitations of "Monetary" 
Analysis by  Paul  A.  Volcker 
Larry Klein's invitation to address this annual joint lun- 
cheon of the American Economic and Finance Associa- 
tions is a special honor. But for one engaged in policy 
making, it also presents a special challenge. He may 
like to think  of himself as a practical man but certainly 
not, as Keynes once put it, the "slave  of some defunct 
economist." At the same time,  he can hardly  regard 
himself as "quite exempt from intellectual influences." 
In that spirit, I would like to take this opportunity to 
consider some of the approaches and practices of cen- 
tral banking in the light of modern economic analysis. 
Now,  I fully realize that neither central  banks as a 
genus nor the species Federal Reserve  —  nor even that 
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special variety  known as the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York—have had a reputation of moving in  the van- 
guard of professional opinion. Nor would I apologize for 
a certain  intellectual conservatism. What we do must 
take account of human attitudes and institutional set- 
tings that necessarily change slowly. Sorting out what 
is true  and valid from  what is fashionable is never easy, 
and we have no  laboratory apart from the American 
economy itself. 
Yet, as one who spent almost 20 years outside the 
Federal Reserve before returning last  year, I can testify 
directly about how much has changed over that period. 
I learned my economics and my central banking in 
the first full flush of the General Theory. Perhaps sym- 
bolically, in the mid-1950s it was still something of a 
challenge to calculate a meaningful  money  supply 
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Reserve, while markets hung on the latest release of 
data on free reserves or bank loans. Today, the situa- 
tion is almost reversed. Our computers spew out Mis  in 
seemingly infinite variety and with great rapidity. Mean- 
while, analysis of the asset side of financial balance 
sheets seems relegated pretty much to a few special- 
ists—or  to bank examiners and the SEC. 
We  need not look to "defunct economists" to help 
explain the change but to a school of thought that is 
very much alive and well! 
Monetarists  and monetary  targeting 
I know one  always treads on dangerous ground  in 
using a shorthand label to describe any school of eco- 
nomic thought. I will therefore run a risk of oversim- 
plification and even injustice in characterizing some of 
the views of the monetarists  today—assessing  the 
contributions and limitations of that analysis. But I don't 
think  there can be much doubt that that school —  for all 
the differences within it  — has helped bring a distinctly 
different flavor to much macroeconomic policy making 
and analysis in recent years. 
Certainly, it has helped bring a new focus on the rel- 
evance of monetary policy—the proposition that the 
stock of money does matter. To be sure, relatively few 
economists—and  almost no central bankers—have 
openly argued the opposite proposition. But implicitly 
or explicitly, there was a rather  common assumption 
two or three decades ago that while the money supply 
did have an effect on credit markets and interest rates 
that received so much attention, the induced effects on 
the economy were not terribly powerful in most situa- 
tions. Changes in the supply of money moved us along 
a rather elastic liquidity preference schedule and the 
investment demand function was thought to be  rela- 
tively  insensitive to interest rates. We therefore need to 
look at fiscal  actions and to other  exogenous forces as 
the main determinants of economic activity. 
As I shall suggest later, the idea that, at least in the 
short run, the supply of money and interest rates are 
related still seems relevant today. But the monetarists 
have usefully emphasized  the danger of confusion 
between nominal and real rates and the role of price 
expectations. They have forcefully  made the case for 
the view that in the long run velocity is not related to 
the stock of money and that, in the same long run, an 
excess supply of money contributes not to real income 
or wealth, but simply to inflation. 
That latter point is, of  course, one of the oldest prop- 
ositions in the history of economic thought. But there is 
no doubt that too often we have lost sight of it amid 
the  urgent search  for solutions  to immediate  policy 
problems. 
The further extensions of the idea—that the rate of 
monetary expansion can have relatively little effect on 
the  real rate of interest over time, and hence on the 
mix of consumption  and investment—are certainly con- 
troversial  in their more  extreme  form.  But certainly 
there is more awareness  today of the real limitations on 
the possibilities for manipulating the mix of fiscal and 
monetary policies to achieve our objectives. 
More generally, while the insight is hardly donfined to 
monetarists, modern analysis has typically emphasized 
the length—and probable variability—in  the lags 
between policy action and the effect on the economy. 
As a result, there is less faith in our ability to make 
short-term adjustments—to "fine-tune" the economy. 
These lessons have not been lost on central banks, 
in the United States or elsewhere. In shaping their poli- 
cies and  policy  pronouncements, monetary  officials 
have provided tangible evidence of the new emphasis 
in the greater prominence given the behavior of broad 
monetary aggregates. 
At the same time, central banks have long shared an 
understandable  human interest  in wanting to hedge 
against an  uncertain future. They want to retain the 
ability to respond flexibly to emerging developments,  to 
probe experimentally with new policy measures, to test 
market reactions, and to learn from those reactions 
before fully committing themselves to new directions. 
Indeed, this flexibility to act and react has long been 
considered a great strength of monetary policy. Con- 
cern that  a needed  degree of flexibility  might  be 
impaired accounted,  I believe, for some initial reluc- 
tance by the Federal Reserve in adopting the practice 
of publicly specifying explicit goals or targets for mone- 
tary aggregates  for any substantial period of time 
ahead. 
More than a year ago, however,  responding to con- 
gressional intent, the practice of each quarter announc- 
ing such targets a year ahead was adopted  — always 
retaining the right to change the targets in the light of 
emerging developments. 
From my viewpoint, this experiment  in "practical 
monetarism" has proved useful. It has assisted in com- 
municating our intentions both to the political authori- 
ties and to the marketplace. I suspect it has provided a 
focus  for  more  informed and  constructive public 
debate. Indeed,  I am  hopeful  that by clarifying  the 
nature of  the policy choices and dilemmas and by more 
clearly relating today's decisions to a longer term hori- 
zon, the temptation to engage in more purely political 
debate about policy choices has been moderated. 
But most important, I think, is the discipline it pro- 
vides for our own debate within the Federal Reserve. In 
my experience, each of our short-term decisions has 
needed to be justified and  rationalized  in our own 
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what growth in money seems appropriate over a longer 
period. The pressure to react,  and the temptation to 
overreact, to each new piece of information must be 
filtered through that earlier judgment and longer 
perspective. 
The  Federal Reserve  is  not  alone among central 
banks in adopting that sort of approach. In that sense, 
we have all been influenced by the monetarist debate. 
But a consensus on the  usefulness of that approach 
does not, of course, imply consensus on the substance 
of policy—just  where the targets should be set,  the 
circumstances under which they might be changed or 
temporarily set aside, and the degree of importance 
accorded other variables, including interest rates. 
Moreover, there is no general agreement on which 
monetary aggregate is most relevant—a matter of 
some importance since both the trend and short-term 
fluctuations frequently diverge. 
'Implementation of monetary targets 
Policy is made up of a succession of short-run deci- 
sions. In making those decisions we face the simple 
fact that, whatever  the stability in the relationship 
between money and nominal income in the longer run, 
there is considerable instability in the relationship over 
time horizons relevant to policy makers. Certainly the 
relationships between money interest rates and nomi- 
nal income have been  unusual over the year or so 
since I rejoined the Federal Reserve. Specifically, over 
the first year of an economic recovery that has proved 
very close to the average of postwar recoveries, the 
velocity of Ml grew substantially more rapidly than his- 
tory or most econometric  analysis  would  have sug- 
gested, taking account of the stability  of interest rates. 
Indeed the phenomenon of stable or even declining 
interest rates taken alone is highly unusual during the 
first year of recovery. 
Suppose an approach had been followed since the 
spring of 1975 that sought  to set aside judgment  in 
favor of the statistical rule book. Presumably a mone- 
tary target would  have been set significantly  higher 
than the roughly 5 percent  growth that  actually 
occurred, assuming of course  a desire to achieve a 
similar pattern of growth. Those who, in contrast to the 
monetary school, emphasized last year the desirability 
of roughly  stable interest  rates to promote vigorous 
recovery have seen that objective materialize.  But 
members of this group typically  grossly overestimated 
the monetary growth that would prove consistent with 
that scenario. I can only conclude that in periods such 
as that we have just been through, we need to be alert 
to possible shifts in the demand for money. Movements 
in interest rates are an essential source of information 
about those shifts in money demand and other relevant 
developments  and  at times remain a useful, if not 
uniquely useful, guide to appropriate policy. 
Recognition of the broad relevance and desirability 
of longer term monetary  targets also has left unre- 
solved important tactical issues as to just how these 
targets should be achieved. This is a matter vigorously 
debated by monetary economists out of concern that 
the choice of technique biases the result. I reveal no 
secret when  I say that the subject returns again and 
again in the discussions of the Federal Open Market 
Committee and is a major preoccupation of  the work  of 
the supporting  staffs at the Board and the Reserve 
Banks. 
The Committee's record of policy actions, now 
released about a month after each  FOMC meeting, 
reflects the results of discussion of the appropriate tac- 
tical  approach  adopted by the Committee  at each 
meeting. (I  might note in passing that the amount of 
information provided in these records probably sets a 
standard among the major central banks of the world 
and represents a degree of openness entirely unknown 
to a central banker of an earlier  generation.) 
These  policy records show that while the precise 
approach varies with circumstances, recent practice 
typically  involves numerical "tolerance" ranges for key 
monetary aggregates for the period immediately 
ahead. While influenced  by the immediate economic 
circumstance, these ranges are designed to be gener- 
ally consistent with the one-year targets, allowing for 
the short-term volatility of the numbers and expecta- 
tions about their near-term behavior. A range is also 
established for the federal funds rate, taking into 
account the evidence we have about the interest rate- 
money supply relationship.  Then  the Open  Market 
Account Manager has the job of providing reserves on 
a week-by-week basis at a rate that is expected to pro- 
duce a federal funds rate (and related money market 
conditions)  within the given  range, typically moving 
higher or lower within that range as the aggregates 
appear to be  relatively  strong or  relatively weak  in 
terms of the objectives for those magnitudes. 
I have not found anyone in the Federal Reserve who 
is wholly satisfied with this technique. To me, one prob- 
lem is that it has encouraged a high degree of sensi- 
tivity throughout  financial  markets to even relatively 
small and potentially transient movements in the fed- 
eral funds rate, because this rate is felt by the market 
to reflect so heavily official intentions. But the relevant 
question, as always, is not whether the present tech- 
nique is  problem free, but whether more satisfactory 
approaches can be devised. No doubt, improvements 
are possible  and will come.  But  no  one  should  be 
under the illusion that any tactical change will end con- 
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ferent judgments about relevant policy variables than 
about operating techniques. 
The proposal  is frequently  made that the Federal 
Reserve would be more successful  in achieving 
desired aggregates within relatively short periods if it 
simply adopted a target path for bank reserves, the 
monetary base, or some variant thereof. These reserve 
magnitudes (at least those exclusive of member bank 
borrowings)  are more or less directly under our control, 
and they can be related to the money supply by pro- 
jections of the "money multiplier." Usually, the concept 
is that these targets would then be adhered to, almost 
regardless of short-term money-market implications. 
One technical question arises immediately. While  I 
do not pretend to econometric expertise, I do know that 
a massive amount of research has been conducted in 
this area. The apparent result is that the relationship 
between money and reserve aggregates, particularly in 
the short run, appears no more reliable than the rela- 
tionship between interest  rates and money. In either 
case—whether one uses money market conditions or 
reaerve measures as the immediate tactical targets— 
one comes up against two hard facts: first, the mone- 
tary aggregates are going to be subject to consider- 
able short-run uncertainty, and second, changes in the 
week-to-week tactical targets will have their impact on 
monetary aggregates only with a significant  (and 
uncertain) lag. 
Let me be more explicit. When short-term  tactical 
objectives are couched in terms of money market con- 
ditions, it is necessary to forecast what the demands 
for the various categories of bank deposits and cur- 
rency are likely to be under given money market condi- 
tions. Alternatively, if  the short-term tactical procedures 
are couched in terms of some reserve aggregate, such 
as nonborrowed reserves, it is necessary to forecast 
the reserve-deposit multipliers for the various monetary 
aggregates  — and of course one must also successfully 
forecast and offset market factors affecting reserves in 
order to hit the reserve target. 
We have techniques to make the needed forecasts 
with both the interest rate and reserve approaches. 
The trouble is the forecast  errors are large no matter 
what procedure  is used, particularly  over periods of 
pne to three  months. Indeed, unimpressive  as they are, 
I am told some of the correlations observed in histori- 
cal data between  reserve measures  and  monetary 
measures would prove to be spurious under a regime 
of rigid reserve targeting. 
These uncertainties are likely to make precise mone- 
tary control elusive  under any set of procedures.  A 
common characteristic of the two approaches is that 
the effect of changes  in  either operating target— 
interest  rates or reserves—on the various monetary 
aggregates takes time to have its full impact, and the 
largest impact is not the closest time horizon. 
The relevancy of these twin problems of forecasting 
errors  and lags  — whatever the tactical  approach 
— is 
that we must constantly balance the danger of under- 
reacting to deviations of the aggregates from target 
paths against the danger of overreacting. Clearly, there 
are risks in not responding to bulges or shortfalls in the 
money supply  relative to objectives. For example, if 
growth in the monetary aggregates falls short of objec- 
tives, but the shortfall is treated as a momentary aber- 
ration and no action is taken, a cumulative shortfall 
may develop, making it harder to retrace our steps. At 
times, the bulges or shortfalls may reflect important 
underlying developments, such as an  unforeseen 
chaige in business activity that we would ignore at our 
peril. 
But the danger of overreacting to deviations in the 
aggregates from targets is just as real. Statistically, 
there is a high probability that any deviation from target 
—even of considerable  size—will prove  temporary. 
Attempts to respond  immediately by shifting reserve 
availability and allowing the money market abruptly to 
tighten  or ease could therefore easily result in whip- 
sawing of the market. More confusion than light might 
be thrown on our intentions as short-term gyrations in 
open market operations obscured any more sustained 
strategy. 
The problem is not a negligible one if one thinks in 
terms of a really substantial month-to-month smooth- 
ing. Since only a relatively small fraction of the impact 
of a given move in reserve availability or money market 
conditions is reflected in the behavior of the monetary 
aggregates in the short run, very large movements in 
reserves and  money  market conditions might be 
needed to correct short-term aberrations. Worse, the 
lagged effect of these moves might then have to be 
offset by even larger movements in the opposite direc- 
tion  in the subsequent period—a  process that could 
easily lead to  a serious disruption of the whole 
mechanism. 
To take a recent example, it is not easy to contem- 
plate what degree of money market tightness might 
have been needed to prevent the 15 percent rate of Ml 
growth that emerged this past April — or the implication 
of that degree of tightness for growth in subsequent 
months as lagged effects continued to be felt. Similarly, 
one wonders if the outright declines in  Ml that have 
occurred in some individual months could have been 
prevented consistent  with any positive federal funds 
rate or, alternatively, through any feasible injection of 
nonborrowed reserves within that month. 
I recognize that few, if any, still seriously push the 
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on track month by month. The significance  of these 
response lags comes in a somewhat longer run con- 
text. But the  general proposition remains: There  are 
risks in quickly adjusting our tactical sights, and risks in 
delay, when the aggregates move off course. 
I know of no purely mechanical procedure to avoid 
these risks—to  ensure just the right degree of respon- 
siveness to deviations from targets. Whether and how 
much to respond will,  I think, always be a difficult mat- 
ter of judgment and won't  be helped much by choice of 
tactical approach. 
Obviously, the search for improved tactical tech- 
niques will and should go on. Perhaps the continuing 
effort to achieve better  econometric models of the mar- 
kets through which open market policy operates will 
help—although I must say frankly that the experience 
we have had does  not encourage me to expect any 
startling breakthroughs.  There may be alternative ways 
of formulating and presenting longer term targets that 
would improve upon present procedures. Even on the 
basis of what  we know now, we need to consider care- 
fully ways in which reserve targets could be more 
extensively used as part of our tactical procedures; 
indeed, the FOMC has done extensive work on this 
issue in recent years. 
LimitatIons of monetary targets 
As we immerse ourselves in these tactical questions, 
however, we need to realize the larger question is not 
tactical but substantive  — how much weight to put on 
the monetary aggregates as opposed to other consid- 
erations. Concentration on the problems of chasing 
aggregate targets should not cause us to neglect their 
limitations. 
I have already suggested that the normal relation- 
ships between the aggregates and the economy can 
break down over time horizons  long enough to be 
highly significant for policy  formulation. There are also 
times when market conditions may deserve attention in 
their own right. One thinks immediately of those occa- 
sions  when  markets are  unusually disturbed to the 
point that a potential impact on business sentiment and 
financial availabilities cannot be ignored. At other 
times, relatively small changes in the apparent posture 
of the Federal Reserve may trigger  undesired expecta- 
tions in the market out of proportion to any presumed 
gain in tracking monetary targets. I think, too, we have 
seen plenty of evidence of the potential sensitivity of 
international financial markets to interest rate differen- 
tials—that floating exchange rates cannot  by them- 
selves eliminate that dimension of policy  concern. 
More broadly, I think the intellectual  emphasis on 
monetary aggregates that developed through the 1960s 
threatened to—and on some occasions  did—go too far 
in implying that credit markets, broadly defined, "don't 
count"—that  they are never or seldom a source of dis- 
turbance in the economy or a legitimate concern of 
policy. Indeed, I suspect the relatively little attention 
directed toward serious and systematic analysis of the 
role of credit markets, toward the financial complexities 
of the economy generally, and toward their disruptive 
potential is a common failing of most modern theoriz- 
ing, regardless of the intellectual starting point. 
We have had many occasions in the 1970s  to pay the 
closest possible attention to particular  financial prob- 
lems  and to the potential vulnerability of various credit 
markets. I would remind you of the recurrent concerns 
about thrift institutions and the mortgage market, Penn 
Central and commercial paper, Herstatt and the Euro- 
dollar market, New York City and the municipal bond 
market, and the rising  level of commercial bank loan 
losses a year ago. Some of these situations had in 
them the potential  for grave problems. Happily, they 
have been contained and dealt with through a variety 
of techniques, more or less of an ad hoc nature. 
But  is it sheer  coincidence that so many of these 
problems have arisen in so short a period? And what  is 
the present significance  of such phenomena as the 
shifting proportions of debt and equity for the nature 
and strength of our recovery, for the vulnerability of the 
economy to inflation or to •new shocks at home  or 
abroad, and therefore for monetary and fiscal policy? 
Perhaps answers to questions like these can be 
traced back in some ultimate sense to the behavior of 
money. But I doubt it: the explanation is  much more 
likely to be found in other phenomena, including 
changes in social and economic attitudes stimulated by 
the earlier  period of relatively stable prosperity. 
I would go further  and raise a question about  the 
practical policy implications of the central policy theme 
of monetarism: that "inflation is always and everywhere 
a purely monetary phenomena." 
I do not want to be misunderstood. Central bankers, 
as custodians of a nation's money, commonly  share the 
observation and intuition that pressures to increase the 
money supply to serve some presumed  short-term 
objective are a basic source of inflationary pressure. 
Certainly, excessive monetary expansion is a sufficient 
condition for inflation, and in the longer run, it is equally 
clear that no important inflation can be sustained with- 
out money rising substantially faster than real income 
(taking into account trend velocity). There is always 
some rate of monetary growth (perhaps zero) that will 
in principle achieve price stability. But in the world in 
which we live, I don't think we can draw much comfort 
from  those principles as a full explanation of where we 
are and a guide as to how to proceed. 
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accelerate after the mid-1960s,  with the rate  reaching a 
peak during 1974 unprecedented  for peacetime. Do we 
really  have an  adequate explanation of this develop- 
ment in terms of an acceleration in the rate of mone- 
tary expansion alone? 
To be sure, there was in that period a faster rate of 
money growth. The  two events were not unrelated. But 
as a technical matter, it is also true that as we got into 
the 1970s, the money relationships were not stable, so 
that monetarists did not succeed better  than others in 
anticipating the full force of double digit inflation. 
Plainly, even over a period of years, the relationship 
between money and inflation is complex and the statis- 
tical association rather loose. We do not need to look 
far to find  other,  and supplementary, explanations of 
price developments in  the 1970s—the oil situation, 
some crop failures, the spread of unions into some new 
areas, and shortages in particular  industries that ran 
up against capacity pressures before the economy as a 
whole reached full employment. 
We can theorize that such developments affect only 
relative prices and need have no effect on the general 
price level if monetary growth is held steady. But the 
argument rests on the assumption of a highly flexible 
and quickly reacting price system. If to the contrary, 
relative price adjustments in circumstances like these 
are typically slow in coming and resisted, economists 
would agree that monetary growth at a noninflationary 
rate would depress the level of real activity. The  ques- 
tion is which view is better according to observations of 
reality, and there  seems to me a lot of evidence that it 
is the latter. 
More  generally, I think we  have to ask ourselves 
about the nature of the economic, social, and political 
forces and attitudes that seem to have aggravated the 
difficulties of reconciling  full employment with  price 
stability. 
It is hardly a satisfactory answer to say that central 
banks in principle can always resist inflationary pres- 
sures by simply refusing to provide enough money to 
finance them.  Set against persistent expansionary 
pressures, aggressive wage demands, monopolistic or 
regulatory patterns that resist downward price adjust- 
ments, and other factors affecting cost levels, such an 
approach would threaten chronic conflict with goals of 
growth  and employment that must rank among the 
most important national objectives. In a democracy,  the 
risk would be not just the political life of a particular 
government, but the democratic  way of government 
itself. 
In this larger social and political setting, we should 
perhaps think of central  banks themselves as "endo- 
genous" to the system. A theory of chronic inflation 
that points only to the money supply is  not going to 
prove adequate to understand  —  or deal with  — inflation 
in today's world. The danger is that it may discourage 
the  search for particular  remedies for particular 
problems. 
There is no doubt in my mind that we must persist in 
finding an answer to our inflationary problems. We can 
take satisfaction in the progress of the past year. The 
current underlying rate of 6 percent or so is half that of 
1974, and it has been maintained in a period of rather 
vigorous recovery. It feels better, and it is better. 
But perhapé the greater test lies ahead. I hear from 
many directions the argument that individuals and insti- 
tutions have pretty well adjusted to the current rate of 
inflation. Further progress, it is said,  may be difficult 
without an unduly depressed economy. Perhaps, the 
argument goes, the better part of wisdom would be to 
live with the current rate rather than to try to reduce it 
further,  aiming ultimately at the restoration of price 
stability. 
Now, I recognize that it is possible to conceptualize 
about fully anticipated inflation being equivalent in its 
real effects to confidence in price stability. But I also 
question whether our institutions or individuals are in 
fact fully adjusted, or really can be expected to adjust, 
to the current rate of price increases or to any sizable 
rate of inflation. In any case, such an adjustment, once 
initially made, would not help us to deal with those 
forces that upset price equilibrium in the past. Indeed I 
suspect the job of dealing with these forces would be 
much more difficult, for the difference between a goal 
of, say, living with 6 percent or a goal of evolving toward 
stability seems to me  profound from a psychological 
point of view. Willingness  to settle for just so much 
inflation, but  no more, would  simply lack creditability 
with the public at large, or indeed, with policy makers 
themselves. Resistance to increases in the name of 
short-term advantages could only be weakened, and 
we would  be off again. And  I think we have learned 
enough to see that in those circumstances, even our 
employment  goals  will fall by the wayside. 
My theme today is simple. As we look back over the 
evolution of thinking about monetary policy and macro- 
economic policy generally over the postwar years, we 
can see the dangers of overly simple and overly confi- 
dent views of the way the economic world works. Even- 
tually, simple doctrine comes up against complex and 
harsh reality. 
Back in the days when I was learning economics and 
central  banking, the General Theory had cast fresh 
light on old problems. The intellectual  contributions 
were immense.  But popularized, bowdlerized,  and 
pressed to extremes, it lost fashion for good reason. 
The monetarists—emphasizing old truths in modern 
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the balance. It is in pressing the point to an extreme 
that the danger lies—the impression that only money 
matters and that a fixed rate of reserve expansion can 
answer most of the complicated problems of economic 
policy. 
In a way, I suppose full confidence in a simple, uni- 
fied view of economic policy is a comforting thing: a 
kind  of security blanket in an uncertain world.  But 
Alfred  North Whitehead, in a different context,  once 
pointed to the danger: "There are no whole truths; all 
truths are half truths. It is trying to treat  them as whole 
truths that plays the devil." 
He overstated the case. The practical man cut adrift 
from  our sense of what  is the greater truth — 
distinguishing, if you  will, the one-eighth truths  from 
the seven-eighths  truths—will soon lose his way. But in 
assessing those truths, he can  never afford to lose 
sight of the messy reality  of the world  in which we live. 
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